reading." Religious liberty scholar Christopher Eisgruber, formerly of New York University Law School, and now President of Princeton University, said, "Every reader will learn something from this remarkable book, and, beginning now, every serious scholar of religious toleration will have to contend with Leiter's bold claims." And the Harvard Law Review opined that the book "exposes several tenuous assumptions underlying the predominant justifications for religious exemptions. At the same time, it provides a fresh and intuitive framework for analyzing conscience-based objections to facially neutral laws that should appeal to legal practitioners, jurists, and philosophers alike."
Even against this backdrop, I have to confess to being a bit surprised that the most distinguished and accomplished conservative scholar of law and religion in the United States, Michael McConnell, formerly a federal judge in Utah (appointed by President George W. Bush) and now a Professor at Stanford Law School, took the time to pen a lengthy review of my book in the Yale Law Journal. 2 That Professor McConnell felt the need to devote forty pages to a 185-page book certainly suggested that something about the arguments had "touched a nerve".
And although McConnell gets the majority of the arguments right, parts of the review do involve mistakes and misrepresentations that sometimes make it read a bit like a "hit job" on a book that, as First Things worried, might actually affect the consensus.
Professor McConnell makes clear at the start why he is worried (internal citations omitted):
Religious beliefs have always generated controversy. But religious freedom-the right of individuals and groups to form their own religious beliefs and to practice them to the extent consistent with the rights of others and with fundamental requirements of public order and the common good-has long been a bedrock value in the United States and other liberal nations. Religious freedom is one thing nearly all Americans, left and right, religious and secular, have been able to agree upon, perhaps because it protects all of us.
Atheists are protected from imposition of prayer and Bible reading in state schools; churches are protected from interference with the hiring of ministers; religious minorities are protected from majoritarian legislation indifferent or hostile to their concerns.
Progressive churches are protected when they oppose segregation or counsel draft resisters; traditionalist churches are protected when they oppose abortion or operate faithbased schools; nontraditional faith groups with unfamiliar worship practices are allowed to carry them out in peace. Because none of us can predict who will hold political power, all of us can sleep more soundly if we know that our religious freedom does not depend on election returns. Congress, the Christian Legal Society, and virtua lly every other religious and civil liberties group. Recently, however, this consensus seems to be weakening-largely from fallout over culture-war issues such as abortion and the legal recognition of same-sex relationships. Many activists on these issues see religion as antagonistic to their interests, and are responding in kind. A new whiff of intolerance is in the air.
University of Chicago law professor and legal philosopher Brian Leiter has entered the debate with his new book Why Tolerate Religion? His answer? Although we should not persecute religious believers, religion as such does not warrant any "special" legal solicitude such as that provided by the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.
" [T] here is no apparent moral reason why states should carve out special protections that encourage individuals to structure their lives around categorical demands that are insulated from the standards of evidence and reasoning we everywhere else expect to constitute constraints on judgment and action." Leiter argues, moreover, that it would be consistent with "principled toleration" for the secular state to affirmatively discriminate against religious believers in access to public spaces, such as by barring student Bible clubs from meeting on public school property, even when every other form of student organization is free to meet. So long as religious believers retain the right to express their own beliefs (including wearing religious symbols and clothing), the regime may advocate a "Vision of the Good" that is "irreligious" and may selectively deny religious believers and religious speakers equal access to public resources and opportunities. (772) (773) The final paragraph is a fair summary of my conclusions, though it omits the fact that I also think religious establishment is compatible with "principled toleration" (McConnell does note that later in the review). My book is silent on all the "culture war" issues, except the French culture war issue about banning the head scarf and Jewish skull caps in the public schools, which I argue is a case of impermissible intolerance. I was surprised, however, by McConnell's association of my argument with "intolerance," since it is a resounding defense of liberty of conscience (as the Elder of the Mormon Church correctly noted), including the liberty of religious conscience, but it denies that liberty of religious conscience is more important than other kinds.
Indeed, it is a curious feature of McConnell's discussion that he never offers a counterargument to the book's central thesis, other than noting that it entails some conclusions to which he is unsympathetic. If a demand for "equality of conscience" constitutes "intolerance," then I will have to plead guilty, but that seems to me a far better position, morally, than shall we say, a philosophical "authority" in these matters), and invoking Alvin Plantinga, a leading philosopher of religion and apologist for the rationality of religious belief. He does not actually defend Plantinga's views on the merits, he just complains that I dismiss them without considering their merits. It is true that I do presuppose the philosophical consensus about the rationality of religious belief, and for a simple reason: others have written other books on this subject (e.g., John Mackie's The Miracle of Theism), and I can not do better than what they have already done. McConnell seems miffed by invocations of epistemic authority, even though his essay is awash in such moves--for example, when he objects that I can not say it is "unwarranted" to believe in God when "many persons, including thinkers of the first rank" (788) do so. Thinkers "of the first rank," of course, have always believed nonsense, hostage as they are to historical contingency and psychological need. But McConnell can not, unfortunately, have it both ways: if the opinions of "thinkers of the first rank" count, then the fact that the vast majority of philosophers of the first rank disagree with Plantinga also counts. McConnell is right to call attention to the fact that if the philosophical consensus is wrong about the epistemic status of some religious beliefs, that will affect some of my arguments (though not, e.g., the ones he singles out at p. 801). But the only relevant response would be on the merits of the epistemic arguments, about which McConnell is utterly silent. 148-149 n. 17].) He continues his criticism of my idea of conscience at p. 785, but then quotes me saying that it is "unlikely any legal system will embrace this capacious approach to liberty of conscience" [WTR, [39] [40] , as though I were agreeing with him about the vagaries of conscience, when the point has nothing to do with that: the point is that no legal system will agree to a scheme of universal exemptions for all claims of conscience. This is also minor. 4. I consider some of the practical problems that would confront a scheme of "universal exemptions" for claims of conscience, considering some ways of resolving them. McConnell completely misstates my conclusion as being that "it is permissible, after all, to single out religious claims and those nonreligious claims that 'mimic' religious claims, and to give them special solicitude" (802). But that is manifestly not the conclusion (see WTR 98-100). That some (but not all) of the practical obstacles to a universal scheme of exemptions could be overcome is not an argument for religious conscience being special and, moreover, it is irrelevant to my main objections to exemptions, namely, that such exemptions often defeat the pursuit of the general welfare (the "Rousseauian objection" as I call it in the book). 
My account of religion in

Three misunderstandings and confusions
1. Why should we protect the free exercise of religion (or other conscientious commitments)? My thesis is that such protections depend upon the moral ideal of "principled toleration" (above). McConnell objects that the First Amendment "does not deem religious belief 'wrong, mistaken, or undesirable'" (779). Well, of course, I did not say that it did. The point is, rather, that when religious believers seek exemptions from laws that proscribe conduct, they are asking for legal toleration of conduct of which the state has disapproved through its 
